Last Updated: Sat, Apr 3, 1999 09:37
KYL AMENDMENTS NOS. 4170-4175 (Senate - June 25, 1996)
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(Ordered to lie on the table.)
[Page: S6869]
Mr. KYL submitted six amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill, S. 1745, supra; as follows:
Amendment No. 4170
At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:
SEC. 237. REQUIREMENT THAT MULTI- LATERALIZATION OF THE ABM TREATY BE DONE ONLY THROUGH TREATY-MAKING POWER.
Any addition of a new signatory party to the ABM Treaty (in addition to the United States and the Russian Federation) constitutes an amendment to the treaty that can only be agreed to by the United States through the treaty-making power of the United States. No funds appropriated or otherwise available for any fiscal year may be obligated or expended for the purpose of implementing or making binding upon the United States the participation of any additional nation as a party to the ABM Treaty unless that nation is made a party to the treaty by an amendment to the Treaty that is made in the same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made.
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Amendment No. 4171
Strike out section 231 and insert in lieu thereof the following new section:
SEC. 231. POLICY ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Policy Concerning Systems Subject to ABM Treaty.--Congress finds that, unless and until a missile defense system, system upgrade, or system component is flight tested in an ABM-qualifying flight test (as defined in subsection (c)), such system, system upgrade, or system component--
(1) has not, for purposes of the ABM Treaty, been tested in an ABM mode nor been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles; and
(2) therefore is not subject to any application, limitation, or obligation under the ABM Treaty.
(b) Prohibitions.--(1) Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for the purpose of--
(A) prescribing, enforcing, or implementing any Executive order, regulation, or policy that would apply the ABM Treaty (or any limitation or obligation under such Treaty) to research, development, testing, or deployment of a theater missile defense system, a theater missile defense system upgrade, or a theater missile defense system component; or
(B) taking any other action to provide for the ABM Treaty (or any limitation or obligation under such Treaty) to be applied to research, development, testing, or deployment of a theater missile defense system, a theater missile defense system upgrade, or a theater missile defense system component.
(2) This subsection applies with respect to each missile defense system, missile defense system upgrade, or missile defense system component that is capable of countering modern theater ballistic missiles.
(3) This subsection shall cease to apply with respect to a missile defense system, missile defense system upgrade, or missile defense system component when that system, system upgrade, or system component has been flight tested in an ABM-qualifying flight test.
(c) AMB-Qualifying Flight Test Defined.--For purposes of this section, an AMB-qualifying flight test is a flight test against a ballistic missile which, in that flight test, exceeds--
(1) a range of 3,500 kilometers; or
(2) a velocity of 5 kilometers per second.
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Amendment No. 4172
At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:
SEC. 237. DEPLOYMENT OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS UNDER THE ABM TREATY.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The threat posed to the national security of the United States, the Armed Forces, and our friends and allies by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and growing both quantitatively and qualitatively.
(2) The deployment of theater missile defense systems will deny potential adversaries the option of threatening or attacking United States forces, coalition partners of the United States, or allies of the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction as a way of offsetting the operational and technical advantages of the United States Armed Forces and the armed forces of our coalition partners and allies.
(3) Although technology control regimes and other forms of international arms control agreements can contribute to nonproliferation, such measures are inadequate for dealing with missile proliferation and should not be viewed as alternatives to missile defense systems and other active and passive measures.
(4) The Department of Defense is currently considering for deployment as theater missile defense interceptors certain systems determined to comply with the ABM Treaty, including PAC3, THAAD, Navy Lower Tier, and Navy Upper Tier (also known as Navy Wide Area Defense).
(5) In the case of the ABM Treaty, as with all other arms control treaties to which the United States is signatory, each signatory bears the responsibility of ensuring that its actions comply with the treaty, and the manner of such compliance need not be a subject of negotiation between the signatories.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that the theater missile defense systems currently considered for deployment by the Department of Defense comply with the ABM Treaty.
(c) Deployment of Systems.--The Secretary of Defense may proceed with the development, testing, and deployment of the theater missile defense systems currently considered for deployment by the Department of Defense.
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Amendment No. 4173
At the end of subtitle D of title X add the following:
SEC. 1044. SENSE OF THE SENATE CONCERNING EXPORT CONTROLS.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) Export controls are a part of a comprehensive response to national security threats. United States exports should be restricted where those threats exist to national security, nonproliferation, and foreign policy interests of the United States.
(2) The export of certain commodities and technology may adversely affect the national security and foreign policy of the United States by making a significant contribution to the military potential of individual countries or by disseminating the capability to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, or use weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. Therefore, the administration of export controls should emphasize the control of these exports.
(3) The acquisition of sensitive commodities and technologies by those countries and end users whose actions or policies run counter to United States national security of foreign policy interests may enhance the military capabilities of those countries, particularly their ability to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, use, and deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. This enhancement threatens the security of the United States and its allies. The availability to countries and end users of items that contribute to military capabilities or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a fundamental concern of the United States and should be eliminated through deterrence, negotiations, and other appropriate means whenever possible.
(4) The national security of the United States depends not only on wise foreign policies and a strong defense, but also a vibrant national economy. To be truly effective, export controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers.
(5) On November 5, 1995, President William J. Clinton extended Executive Order No. 12938 regarding `Weapons of Mass Destruction', and `declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons'.
(6) A successor regime to COCOM (the Coordinating Commission on Multilateral Controls) has not been established. Currently, each nation is determining independently which dual-use military items, if any, will be controlled for export.
(7) The United States should play a leading role in promoting transparency and responsibility with regard to the transfers of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) establishing an international export control regime, empowered to control exports of dual-use technology, is critically important and should become a top priority for the United States; and
(2) the United States should strongly encourage its allies and friends to--
(A) adopt a commodity control list which governs the same or similar items as are controlled by the United States Commodity Control list;
(B) strengthen enforcement activities; and
(C) explore the use of unilateral export controls where the possibility exists that an export could contribute to proliferation.
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Amendment No. 4174
At the end of title XXXIII, add the following:
SEC. 3303. ADDITIONAL DISPOSAL AUTHORITY.
(a) Additional Materials Authorized for Disposal.--In addition to the quantities of materials authorized for disposal under subsection (a) of section 3302 as specified in the table in subsection (b) of that section, the President may dispose of the materials specified in the table in subsection (b) of this section in accordance with that section.
(b) Table.--The table in this subsection is as follows:
Additional Authorized Stockpile Disposal
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Material for disposal Quantity
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Titanium Sponge 10,000 short tons.
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Amendment No. 4175
On page 108, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
SEC. 368. PROHIBITION OF SALE OR RENTAL OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIAL.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 147 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
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`2490b. Sale or rental of sexually explicit material prohibited.
`(a) Prohibition of Sale or Rental: The Secretary of Defense may not permit the sale or rental of sexually explicit written or videotaped material on property under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
`(b) Prohibition of Officially Provided Sexually Explicit Material: A member of the Armed Forces or a civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense acting in an official capacity for sale remuneration or rental may not provide sexually explicit material to another person.
`(c) Regulations: The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement this section.
`(d) Definitions: In this section:
`(1) The term `sexually explicit material' means an audio recording, a film or video recording, or a periodical with visual depictions, produced in any medium, the dominant theme of which depicts or describes nudity, including sexual or excretory activities or organs, in a lascivious way.
`(2) The term `property under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense' includes commissaries, all facilities operated by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Exchange Service Command, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, Marine Corps exchanges, and ship stores.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
`2490b. Sale or rental of sexually explicit material prohibited.
(b) Effective Date: Subsection (a) of section 2490b of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
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END
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